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Abstract
Background: Previous research has shown that object recognition may develop well into late childhood and adolescence.
The present study extends that research and reveals novel differences in holistic and analytic recognition performance in 7–
12 year olds compared to that seen in adults. We interpret our data within a hybrid model of object recognition that
proposes two parallel routes for recognition (analytic vs. holistic) modulated by attention.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Using a repetition-priming paradigm, we found in Experiment 1 that children showed no
holistic priming, but only analytic priming. Given that holistic priming might be thought to be more ‘primitive’, we
confirmed in Experiment 2 that our surprising finding was not because children’s analytic recognition was merely a result of
name repetition.
Conclusions/Significance: Our results suggest a developmental primacy of analytic object recognition. By contrast, holistic
object recognition skills appear to emerge with a much more protracted trajectory extending into late adolescence.
Citation: Wakui E, Ju¨ttner M, Petters D, Kaur S, Hummel JE, et al. (2013) Earlier Development of Analytical than Holistic Object Recognition in Adolescence. PLoS
ONE 8(4): e61041. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061041
Editor: Katsumi Watanabe, University of Tokyo, Japan
Received October 31, 2012; Accepted March 5, 2013; Published April 5, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Wakui et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This study was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant RES-062-0167) and by the Heidehof Stiftung (grant 50302.01/4.10). The
funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: m.juttner@aston.ac.uk
Introduction
The present paper is concerned with the development of the
long-term representation of visual shapes used for the recognition
and naming of common objects. Despite indications of remarkably
selective visual representations even in 3-to 4-month-olds (e.g.,
[1,2]) there is increasing evidence that object recognition may only
become fully adult-like late into childhood and adolescence
([3,4,5]; for a review see [6]). However, the cause of this
protracted development is not well understood. In the past,
similar claims have been made more frequently for face
recognition skills where there is substantial evidence for a continu-
ing improvement deep into the second decade of life (e.g., [7,8,9]).
Much of the late developing skills for face recognition has been
attributed to the processing of spatial relations; indeed, similar
protracted configural skills also affect the recognition of non-face
objects in children up to an age of 12 years [5].
Here we present another aspect of object recognition that has
a tardy development and one that is at first a surprise. Popular
image-based approaches to object recognition (e.g., [10,11,12])
propose ‘holistic’ representations that are ‘all-in-one’, or view-like,
where object features are represented in terms of their literal
position in a pictorial, two-dimensional coordinate system. Indeed,
all object recognition can be explained from such holistic
representations [13] though they are alternatively contrasted with
the classical idea of an analytical, structural object description
based on certain volumetric primitives and their categorical
relations [14,15]. One point to note is that the use of the term
holistic in studies of object recognition differs from the one
prevailing in research into face recognition. For the latter, ‘holistic’
typically implies a more sophisticated form of configural proces-
sing in which the recognition of an individual facial feature
interferes with the context provided by other, neighbouring
features (for a review see e.g. [9]). Depending on the task the
interference with facial context may either facilitate recognition of
the target feature (e.g., [16]) or impede it (e.g., [17]). Such
configural-holistic processing for faces matures early and reaches
adult level by the age of six [18,19]. Whether its presence implies
a specific representational format for faces that differs from that for
non-face objects has been controversial (see e.g. [20] but [21]) and
remains an issue for further research. However, with respect to
holistic representations as used in object recognition, such simple
representations too would be presumed to be acquired early in
cognitive development.
To differentiate the development of holistic and analytic object
recognition, we make use of Hummel’s [22] dual route model of
object recognition (cf. also [23]). According to the model, objects
are represented and processed in two different formats - analytical
and holistic – that are combined into a hybrid representation in
long-term memory. The analytic pathway involves explicit
structural descriptions based on an object’s parts and their
relations whereas the holistic pathway is view-like. An important
characteristic of Hummel’s model are the different attentional
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demands of the two processing routes. The analytical route is
assumed to require visual attention to mediate the dynamic
binding between the segmented parts of an object and the relations
that hold between them, thus providing a structural object
description that is invariant to transformations like left-right
reflection and some rotations in depth. By contrast, the holistic
pathway is considered to operate independently of attention as the
object’s local shape features are statically bound by their relative
location within a so-called surface map. The surface map preserves
topological relations of these features, resulting in a holistic
representation that is sensitive to left-right reflection and rotation.
Predictions of the dual-route model concerning the modulating
effect of attention have been tested in repetition-priming
experiments. Such studies typically compare the effect of two
briefly presented prime stimuli: one attended and the other
ignored. Priming is assessed in terms of the facilitation for naming
a subsequently presented probe stimulus. According to the model,
holistic priming could in principle be observed both for the
attended and the ignored prime stimulus. However, given the
view-like object representation used by the holistic route the
priming would critically depend on the pictorial identity of prime
and probe. By contrast, analytic priming should result only from
the attended prime stimulus. Due to the more abstract object
format implied by the analytic route, this priming should tolerate
image differences between probe and prime as long as those
permit at least a partial matching of the underlying structural
representations. In line with these predictions, analytic - but not
holistic - priming has been found to be robust to a variety of
manipulations of object view including left-right mirror reflection
[24], image splitting [25], plane rotation [26] and rotation in
depth [27]. Moreover, the analytic priming in these studies strictly
depended on attentional allocation and was absent for ignored
primes, whereas holistic priming was observed for both attended
and ignored primes as suggested by the dual-route model. Further,
neural evidence for the model comes from the results of a recent
study assessing repetition priming in conjunction with fMRI [28].
These suggest a mapping of the two routes on the ventral and
dorsal visual-processing streams [29], with ventral stream regions
being implied in both analytical and holistic processing and holistic
processing only in dorsal stream regions.
The extent to which the holistic and analytic routes contribute
to object recognition in the developing mind remains uncertain.
With regard to the analytic route there is good evidence that even
young children and toddlers give special importance to part
information for object categorization and naming (e.g.,
[30,31,32,33,34]), and that 7- to 8-year-olds perform already
close to adult levels when recognizing part changes in familiar
objects [5]. However, no previous research has considered the
developmental trajectory of the holistic processing route. As this
route operates automatically and irrespective of attentional
allocation it has been proposed (e.g., [22]) to account for the
surprising speed of object recognition well documented at
behavioural [35] and neurophysiological [36] levels. On that
account, the fast holistic route could be seen as a more elementary
and ontologically primary path compared to the slower, more
elaborate and more abstract processing provided by the analytical
pathway. Nevertheless, Thoma and Davidoff [37] demonstrated
that holistic priming is not observed with unfamiliar object views
as prime stimuli. Holistic priming effects therefore appear to
depend on long-term memory representations of visual shape and
to differ from the facilitation observed in sequential visual
matching. The latter would be expected to provide an advantage
also in case of unfamiliar stimuli, i.e., in the absence of any long-
term object representation (e.g., [38,39,40]). Thus, holistic
processing may require prolonged visual experience and, as
a consequence, show a late maturation. In our experiments, we
tested that hypothesis employing a repetition-priming paradigm
which we adapted for use with children in our target age range
from 7 to 11 years. The children’s performance was contrasted
with that of young adults as control and reference.
In Experiment 1, we assessed the role of attention in repetition
priming for identical and left-right reflected images. According to
the dual route model, analytical and holistic processing should
make independent contributions to priming. More specifically,
analytical processing is demonstrated by attended but not ignored
images priming themselves and their left- right reflections to the
same extent. Holistic processing should manifest itself as an
additional advantage of identical over left-right reflected images
and should be equal for attended and ignored primes. We used
these behavioural markers to contrast the involvement of
analytical and holistic processing in children and adults, and to
establish the relative dominance of the two routes during the
development of object recognition.
Experiment 1
Methods
Ethics statement. All experimental procedures were ap-
proved by the Ethics Committees of Goldsmiths College and
Aston University prior to the commencement of the study.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants, in case of
children also from the parents or guardians and the participating
schools.
Participants. There were three age groups: Twenty-eight 7/
8-year-olds (mean age 7 years 9 months; 13 females, 15 males),
twenty-eight 11/12-year-olds (mean age 11 years 9 months; 12
females, 16 males), and twenty-eight adult volunteers (mean age 22
years 9 months; 20 females, 8 males). The children were drawn
from state schools in Birmingham and London, UK. The adults
were recruited among undergraduate Psychology students at
Goldsmiths College. They received course credit for participation.
Stimuli and apparatus. We used a set of 56 black-and-white
line drawings of asymmetrical familiar animals and non-face
objects. The stimuli were taken from the Rossion and Pourtois
[41] version of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart [42] picture set.
They were presented on a 15.6 inch monitor with a screen size
(height6width) of 20.4633 cm, subtending a visual angle of
19.5u631.5u at the viewing distance of 60 cm. The images were
standardized in size to subtend 4.5u64.5u. For each object,
a mirror-reflected version was created using Adobe Photoshop.
Voice responses were detected through a dynamic trigger
microphone attached to an interface box. Stimulus presentation
and response collection were controlled by an Eprime 1.1
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) script running on a Toshiba
laptop computer.
Procedure. Participants were tested using the repetition
priming paradigm of Stankiewicz et al. [24] (cf. Fig. 1a). Each
trial sequence began with a centrally presented circle (size: 0.032u)
as a ready signal. In a change to Stankiewicz et al.’s original
procedure, and to make the procedure feasible for the use with
children, the experimenter rather than the participant initiated the
rest of the trial. First, a central fixation cross appeared for 495 ms
followed by a blank screen for 30 ms. Next an attentional precue,
a square (4.5u64.5u), was shown centred either 4u to the left or to
the right from fixation, counterbalanced across trials for each
participant. After 75 ms two prime images were simultaneously
displayed for 120 ms, with the to-be-attended image inside the
square and the to-be-ignored image at an equal distance to the
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other side of the screen. They were followed by a random-line
mask (15.6u615.6u) for 495 ms. The entire prime display lasted
less than 200 ms, a duration too short to permit a voluntary
saccade to the cue or any of the two prime images. Participants
were required to name the cued (attended) object as quickly and
accurately as possible.
After the prime display, a blank screen was presented for
1995 ms. The probe sequence started with a fixation cross, shown
for 495 ms and a blank screen shown for 30 ms. The probe image
was then displayed in the centre of the screen for 150 ms followed
by a random-line mask (4.6u64.6u) for 495 ms. Participants were
required to name the probe object. Feedback on the names of the
prime and the probe was displayed and the experimenter coded
the accuracy of the responses using the buttons of a computer
mouse; this also initiated the next trial.
The experimental session consisted of a series of 12 practice
trials and 24 experimental trials. The practice trials served to
familiarize the participant with the task and the procedure. To
children, the experiment was introduced as a computer game to
ensure their interest and motivation. In each trial there were five
possible stimulus conditions concerning the relation between
prime and probe stimuli (Fig. 1b): The probe could be identical to
the attended prime (condition: Attended–Identical) or its mirror
reflection (Attended-Reflected); or it could be identical to the
unattended prime (Ignored-Identical) or its mirror reflection
(Ignored-Reflected), or it could depict a completely different
object (Unprimed). Each picture was used only once in each
experimental session, either as a prime or a probe. Across
observers, all stimuli appeared equally often in all stimulus
conditions. The practice trials involved a set of images different
from the experimental set.
Results and Discussion
Performance was analyzed in terms of the extent of priming,
which was calculated as the participant’s mean response time at
the probe in the unprimed (baseline) condition minus the mean
response time in the corresponding experimental condition. Trials
on which there were voice key errors or either the prime or probe
response was incorrect (17.3%) were excluded from the analysis.
Only responses within 63 MAD from the median latency were
included in the analysis.
Figure 2 shows the mean priming for each age group as
a function of attentional allocation and probe view. The priming
data were entered into a 2 (Attention: Attended vs. Ignored)62
(View: Identical vs. Reflected)63 (Age: Adults vs. 11–12 years vs.
7–8 years) mixed ANOVA with Age as between factor. The
analysis gave a significant main effect of Attention
[F(1,79) = 28.86, p,.001, gp
2 = .268] and a significant interaction
between View and Age [F(2,79) = 3.53, p,.05, gp
2 = .082].
Follow-up t-tests showed that only adults showed an effect of
View with priming from identical images greater than from
reflected images [72.9 ms vs. 45.5 ms; t(27) = 3.15, p,.005]. All
other main effects were non-significant [Age: F(2,79) = 1.18,
p = .17; View: F(1,79) = .89, p = 0.35], as were all remaining
interactions (ps ..67).
The age dependent effects on priming could not be explained by
differences in the number of correct naming trials included in the
analysis which might have affected the statistical power to detect
priming in younger children. An additional one-way ANOVA of
the relative proportion of such correct trials (group means: 7–8
years:.82; 11–12 years:.83; adults:.87) across the three age groups
proved non-significant (F(2,81) = 1.91; p = .16).
The results demonstrate a clear dissociation between children
and adults regarding the impact of priming on object recognition.
While all age groups showed a reliable facilitation of naming for
attended prime stimuli, it was only adults who showed an
additional benefit from identical views of probe and prime,
regardless of attentional allocation. The additional facilitation for
adults comes from the benefit of having automatically activated
holistic representations; this advantage is absent in the two groups
of children even for stimuli to which they are directing their
attention. The contrasting results cannot be explained in terms of
the well-documented limitations in children’s ability to voluntarily
deploy attention to specified regions in the visual field (e.g.,
[43,44]). When given a locational precue - as in the present study -
even 5-year olds have been shown to use attention to filter out
distractors as well as adults [44]. Indeed, the consistent facilitation
observed for attended primes in both the 7 to 8 and 10 to 11-year-
olds demonstrates the effectiveness of that attentional manipula-
tion.
The observed pattern of results also cannot be accounted for by
assuming that the prime display constitutes a higher perceptual
load in children than in adults, thus potentially leading to
a reduced accessibility of the unattended, to-be-ignored prime
stimulus (e.g., [45]). Such an explanation fails to explain the
interaction between View and Age, in particular the notable
absence of an additional facilitation of attended identical relative
to attended mirror-reflected primes in both groups of children (ps
.0.40) - a result that contrasts with the significant facilitation
found for adults [t(27) = 2.38, p,0.05].
The observed pattern of priming effects in children, i.e., the lack
of priming by unattended identical primes and the equivalence of
priming for attended identical and mirror-reflected primes,
suggests that children – unlike adults – do not employ view-like,
holistic representations for object naming. Rather they only draw
on representations that are invariant to certain structural
manipulations like mirror reflection. In principle, such representa-
tions would be mediated by analytical structural descriptions.
However, our data could also simply arise as a consequence of
name repetition. To test this possibility, we conducted a second
experiment.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, children only showed priming to attended
stimuli. The lack of a difference between the Identical and the
Reflected condition could indicate a mediating visual object
representation that is sufficiently abstract to afford invariance to
reflection. Alternatively, it could be the consequence of name
priming, i.e., induced by the fact that the prime and probe referred
to the same concept regardless of any visual transformation. For
adults, previous research has shown that priming from attended
images is largely visual in nature (e.g., [46,24,25]) and therefore
not the result of name repetition. However, given the striking
differences in the priming pattern observed for children in
Experiment 1 an additional study was run to directly compare
the impact of visual priming and name priming.
In Experiment 2, the Identical view condition of Experiment 1
was replaced with a Same-Name-Different-Examplar (SNDE)
condition in which prime and probe image showed objects with
the same basic-level category name (cf. [47]) but different shapes.
For example, a prime image showing an upright piano would be
followed by probe image showing a grand piano, thus eliciting the
same response (‘‘piano’’) for a stimulus with a different shape.
The images of the Reflected condition were the same as in
Experiment 1, as were the attentional manipulations. Thus,
Experiment 2 provided a direct comparison of the effects of name
priming (as assessed in the SNDE condition) against analytical
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visual priming (as assessed in the Reflected condition). If any of the
priming observed for attended, mirror-reflected objects in
Experiment 1 was specifically visual, Experiment 2 should yield
significantly less priming for attended stimuli in the SNDE relative
to the Reflected condition. Conversely, if that priming was the
result of name repetition then attended SNDE primes should be at
least as effective as attended mirror-reflected primes.
Methods
Ethics statement. All experimental procedures were ap-
proved by the Ethics Committees of Goldsmiths College and
Aston University prior to the commencement of the study.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants, in case of
children also from the parents or guardians and the participating
schools.
Participants. Three age groups took part, each consisting of
28 participants: 7/8-year-olds (mean age 8 years 0 months; 12
females, 16 males), 10/11-year-olds (mean age 10 years 5 months;
17 females, 11 males), and adult volunteers (mean age 27 years 9
months; 18 females, 10 males). The children were drawn from
state schools in Birmingham and London, UK. The adults were
recruited among undergraduate Psychology students at Gold-
smiths College. They received course credit for participation.
Stimuli and apparatus. A set of 112 black-and-white line
drawings of asymmetrical familiar animals and objects was used.
Stimuli were divided into 56 pairs such that each object had
a SNDE counterpart, i.e., an exemplar of a different shape but
with the same name, i.e., the same basic-level category name. Half
of them were identical to the stimuli used in Experiment 1. The
SNDE exemplars were line drawings of a similar style, and were
adopted from Thoma et al. [25] (Experiment 2).
Procedure. The procedure used in Experiment 2 was
identical to that employed in Experiment 1, with the exception
that identical primes were replaced by SNDE primes, both in the
attended and non-attended condition. Across participants, all
objects appeared equally often in each prime-probe condition.
Results and Discussion
Performance was again analysed in terms of the observed
priming. As in Experiment 1, trials on which there were voice key
errors or either the prime or probe response was incorrect (13.7%)
were excluded from the analysis. As in Experiment 1, only
responses 63 MAD from the median were included in the
analysis. Following this criterion, two participants in the age group
7–8 years were classified as outliers and removed from the data
prior to the statistical analysis.
The mean priming in Experiment 2 for each age group as
a function of attentional allocation and probe view is shown in
Figure 3. The priming data were entered into a 2 (Attention:
Attended vs. Ignored)62 (View: Reflected vs. SNDE)63 (Age:
Adults vs. 11–12 years vs. 7–8 years) mixed ANOVA, again with
Age as between factor. It gave significant main effects of Attention
[F(1,76) = 13.09, p,.001, gp
2 = .147] and View [F(1,76) = 6.42,
p,.01, gp
2 = .078] but not of Age [F(2,76) = .34, p= .71]. In
addition, there was a strong trend in the interaction between
Attention and View [F(2,76) = 3.5, p= .06, gp
2 = .044]. To follow
up the interaction the data were collapsed across age groups.
Paired t-tests showed that priming in the attended reflected
condition (73.7 ms) was significantly greater than in the attended
SNDE condition [24.0 ms; t(27) = 4.08, p,.001]. All other
interactions did not reach statistical significance p..6. By contrast,
there was no priming for ignored stimuli. Priming by ignored
reflected stimuli and ignored SNDE stimuli were both not
significantly different from zero (ps .0.5; one-sample t-test).
Experiment 2 showed that a probe object was primed more by
an attended mirror-reflected version of the same image than by
a different exemplar of the same basic-level category. In both
cases, participants responded with the same name in probe and
prime trials, which suggests that the advantage of the mirror-
reflected condition was the result of visual rather than concept
priming. These findings did not depend on age group and are
consistent with previous work involving adult observers only (e.g.,
[46,24,25]). They support the conclusion that the priming in the
Figure 1. Sequence of events and stimulus conditions in Experiment 1. As indicated in (A) in each trial the participant had to name the
objects shown as cued prime and as probe. The five conditions concerning the relation between probe and prime display are illustrated in (B).
Accordingly, the probe could be identical to either the cued (attended) prime, the ignored (unattended) prime, or to their respective mirror-reflected
versions. For each condition, priming was measured in terms of the response time reduction relative to the unprimed baseline condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061041.g001
Figure 2. Results for Experiment 1. Priming means as a function of attentional allocation (Attended vs Ignored) and view (Identical vs Reflected)
for each age group in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0061041.g002
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attended condition observed for children in Experiment 1 was
mediated by visual representations, which within the context of the
dual route model can be qualified as being analytic in the sense
that they are invariant to certain structural manipulations like
mirror reflection.
General Discussion
The present investigation is the first developmental study to
directly compare analytical and holistic processing in object
recognition. With respect to the less cognitive task of perceptual
organization, substantial previous research has explored the role of
age. In particular, the ability to integrate local visual features
spatially across the visual field (e.g., [48,49]) and the sensitivity to
global structure in hierarchical visual stimuli (e.g., Navon patterns)
has been found to continue to develop into late childhood and
early adolescence (e.g., [50,51]). Thus, the developmental evidence
suggests that the precedence for global shape in visual percepts
typically observed in adults may only develop late ontogenetically.
Our experiments go beyond that research by demonstrating
a precedence of analytic processing for object recognition proper,
i.e., the matching of a visual percept to a memory representation.
Across our target age range of 7–11 years, the participating
children showed consistent significant effects of analytical priming
suggesting the availability of structural, part-based object repre-
sentations. However, more dramatically, the children equally
consistently failed to show any evidence of holistic priming, thus
indicating a much reduced impact of holistic representations on
object recognition compared to those of the analytic route. Holistic
object recognition skills appear to emerge with a protracted
trajectory that extends into late adolescence.
Why is the analytical path the primary route used by children?
Unlike for the identification of faces, the recognition of objects
typically occurs at the so-called basic level [47], where parts and
their spatial configuration provide reliable information for success-
ful categorization and naming. The analytic object processing
mediating recognition at this level has been proposed to involve
highly regularized structural descriptions [14,22]. While the
formation of such descriptions requires attentional binding, the
resulting representations are robust against many accidental
changes in object view (for example, due to a small rotation in
depth) thus facilitating their consolidation in long-term memory.
Moreover, such descriptions offer – even with relatively few parts -
substantial representational power for basic-level categories [14]
which may make them a preferred route for knowledge extension
in children.
A fundamental implication of our data is that holistic
representations are not those primarily used in object recognition.
Holistic object representations have been conceptualized as
collection of features bound together implicitly through their
coordinates in a quasi-pictorial, view-like format (e.g., [10,11,12]).
While such representations are structurally simpler and appear less
dependent on directed visual attention, their consolidation in long-
term memory may be hindered by their limited invariance to
manipulations of object view. Current view-based models do not
directly address issues of development but object learning
experiments in adult observers suggest that the acquisition of
view-based object representations is predominantly driven by
statistical learning (e.g., [11]). During such learning, distinct views
emerge as a result of gradual familiarization with clusters of
viewpoint-specific features. Thus, holistic object recognition skills
may crucially depend on repeated exposure to the same stimulus
presented from the same viewpoint which would explain the need
of a prolonged period of consolidation. In line with this notion,
repetition priming experiments have found holistic priming only
for familiar probe views but not unfamiliar ones [37].
While holistic object recognition skills take surprisingly long to
develop, once acquired they may offer a shortcut to enable
particularly fast object recognition [35,36]. They may also provide
– through possible involvement of the dorsal pathway [28] -
a facilitation of hand movements that subserve the interaction with
objects [29] even though the neurological basis underlying their
development is still awaiting elucidation.
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